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Abstract: The “Resource Curse” is a stylized fact that has been observed consistently in a
number of development studies: countries that are relatively well-endowed with
natural resources tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor economies. This
paper documents evidence that the Resource Curse extends to the individual states
of the U.S.  Using a variety of specifications, regression of state GSP growth on
resource abundance consistently shows a negative and significant relationship. 
There is strong evidence that resource-based economies are more volatile
economies, and volatile economies may be less desirable to investors.  
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The “Resource Curse” and Regional U.S. Development
I.  Introduction
The “Resource Curse” is a stylized fact that has been observed consistently in a number
of development studies: countries that are relatively well-endowed with natural resources tend to
grow more slowly than resource-poor economies.  The curse is something of a paradox, given the
usual presumption that resource abundance serves as a potential source of income that can be
converted to both physical and intellectual capital to support future growth.  Rents from the
exports of raw materials, for example, could be used to free children from agricultural work and
support their education, thereby increasing the nation’s potential future productivity.
While some nations have undoubtedly used resource endowments in just this fashion
(coal and iron-ore endowments in northern Europe helped set off the industrial revolution in the
early 19
th century; Latin America progressed markedly after the resource booms there later in the
same century), the recent record is one of under-performance by resource-rich countries.  Casual
observation confirms that the Oil States of the Middle East and many exceptionally resource-
abundant countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have been unable to maintain
sustained rapid economic growth, while resource-poor nations like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
have compiled enviable records of development that have brought them to industrial-country
status in two generations or less.  More comprehensive empirical tests by Sachs and Warner
(2001), Gylfason (2001), and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) confirm the resource curse
hypothesis using a variety of specifications and cross-country samples.
Several theoretical rationales have been advanced to explain the poor development
performance of resource-abundant countries.  One is “crowding out”: the exploitation of natural2
resources crowds out other activities, such as manufacturing, that may have smaller short-run
returns, but may be more productive in the long-run.  Crowding out occurs directly, through the
transfer of labor and other inputs to the resource sector, and indirectly, by driving up prices of
non-traded goods, thereby making the manufactured sector less competitive internationally.
Sachs and Warner (2001) confirm that non-traded goods prices are higher in resource-abundant
economies.   
A resource boom may also cause the exchange rate to appreciate (the so-called “Dutch
Disease,” whereby  energy discoveries in the Netherlands caused the phenomenon described),
inducing a switch to foreign made products and further eroding domestic manufactures.  Because
it is usually assumed that manufacturing generates positive externalities through technological
spillovers or increasing returns to scale, diminishment of the manufacturing sector leads to lower
long-run economic growth.
A refinement of the crowding-out hypothesis is the de-emphasis of education in resource-
rich economies.   Gylfason (2001) notes that resource-based industries are less high-skill based
than manufacturing and service industries, and that skills that are acquired may be less
transferable to downstream sectors, which would explain the reduced emphasis on general
education in resource-rich countries.  Empirical evidence by Gylfason (2001) demonstrates a
strong negative relationship between resource abundance and enrollment in at all levels of
education in a cross-section of countries.  For example, OPEC countries send only 57 percent of
children to secondary schools versus 64 percent for the world as a whole, and total educational
expenditures as a percent of GDP are also lower than the world average.  
Moreover, as pointed out by Gylfason and by Sachs and Warner (2001), the de-emphasis3
of education in resource-rich economies may be a symptom of the broader problem of poor
governance in these economies, a consequence of rent-seeking behaviors and concentrated
ownership of productive facilities.  The latter serves to concentrate also political power and
thereby promotes policies that favor the few (protectionism, inequitable taxation) at the expense
of policies that favor the many (free trade, education, transparency), while rent-seeking behavior
operates on the assumption that resource rents are easily appropriable, diverting labor and effort
away from productive activity and encouraging bribes and public favors.
Longer-term, consistently poor choices may lead to dysfunctional government
institutions, such as a breakdown in the rule of law or a lack of independence for the monetary
authority.  Bulte, Damania, and Deacon [BDD] (2003), building on arguments advanced by Auty
(2001), claim that it is not the natural resources, per se, that cause sub-par growth, but the
indirect effects of resource abundance acting through the channel of institutional quality that lead
to poor economic outcomes.   
BDD note that there are, in fact, many examples of resource abundant countries that have
managed development quite well, including Norway (Oil), Botswana (Diamonds), and Malaysia
(Timber, Mining), so that natural resources are not necessarily a drag on performance.  However,
some resources, especially so-called “point” resources, like oil, appear to be especially
susceptible to control by narrow interests and therefore vulnerable to poor institutions and poor
quality.
BDD expand their analyses to other measures of development such as poverty, life
expectancy, and percent of children undernourished.  The idea here is that per capita income may
be too narrow a measure of development, and may mask significant inequities across the1In the U.S., for example, one could point to the institution of slavery in the antebellum
South, which perpetuated an agrarian economic base, low education levels (for blacks and poor
whites), and very little industrial development relative to the North.
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population, especially if income from resource development is highly concentrated.  BDD find
that resource abundance does not have a direct effect on development indicators (that is, holding
income and institutional quality intact), but that abundance does have an indirect effect by
contributing to the degradation of institutional quality, notably through greater levels of
corruption.
The emerging consensus in the development literature appears to conclude that the
resource curse is a robust empirical regularity, albeit with several, not necessarily exclusive or
exhaustive, theoretical rationale.  Current refinements indicate that point resources (like mining,
oil and gas extraction) are more detrimental to growth than diffuse resources (like agriculture or
aquaculture), perhaps because point resources are more easily controlled by small groups in
society, resulting in policies and institutions designed to serve narrow interests.
One danger in any empirical study that purports to demonstrate that variable “X” causes
variable “Y” is that there exists some variable “Z” that causes both “X” and “Y”, but is itself
unmeasured.  Thus in the present case, there may be heterogeneous factors, such as government
or social institutions, that contribute to both poor development and resource exploitation,
especially in the broad cross-section of countries that normally comprise the data set for growth
regressions.
1
Although researchers have been increasingly ingenious in deriving new instruments to2Including legal traditions, diversity of languages, geographic characteristics, and many
others; see, for example, Acemoglu, et al. (2001).
3Here “natural resources” or simply “resources” are defined to be agriculture and mining,
which includes oil and gas extraction.
4There are papers, for example Iledare and Olatubi (2004) that examine the effects of
fluctuations in resource prices on state economies, but these are primarily concerned with
cyclical events.
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control for unmeasured heterogeneity across countries
2, there is still some uncertainty as to
whether the observed relationship is real or spurious.  Though this issue can never be settled
definitively, one approach to resolving it is to subject the resource curse hypothesis to test using a
more homogeneous data set, namely the states of the U.S.  The states differ in relative resource
abundance, with the states of the West and Southwest being especially resource rich
3.  The U.S.
states have the obvious advantage of having very similar government institutions, an overlying
constitution and federal law, free movement across borders, and so on.
The objective of this study is to quantify the relationship between resource abundance and
various indicators of state economic development.  Beyond testing the resource curse itself, it
may be of interest to explore the relationship between resource abundance and state development
for its own sake.  There have been many studies comparing and contrasting paths of state
development, dealing with such questions as regional convergence of incomes (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1991); precedence of supply or demand factors as drivers of state economic growth
(Freeman, 2001; Mathur and Song, 1995); and coincidence of regional economic cycles
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992), to give a very partial list.  None of these differentiate the role of
natural resources in regional development, although many use some indicator of resource
markets, such as oil prices, as a control variable.
4  This paper, by contrast, examines directly the6
effect of resource abundance as a differentiating factor in the economic development of
individual states.
Figure 1 displays the scatterplot of the growth of Gross State Product (GSP) per capita on
the vertical axis and the percent of GSP originating in agriculture and mining, the two sectors
usually identified with natural resources.  The relationship is statistically significant (t = 5.02),
and robust to re-estimation using different time periods (not shown).  The relationship is
apparently not due to regression to the mean: a similar chart of initial GSP/capita and share of
GSP originating in natural resources has r-square = 0.06, t = 1.78, but only t = 0.045 if one
outlier (Wyoming) is excluded.  Therefore there is little evidence that resource-rich states start
out ahead and resource-poor states are simply catching up through convergence.  
[Figure 1 about here]
We expand on the evidence of Figure 1 by using now standard empirical tests of
conditional convergence as introduced by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992) as extended for panel data by Islam (1995) to show that states with larger
employment shares in the primary sector – agriculture and mining – have lower subsequent
growth rates when controlling for initial conditions.  These results are robust to a variety of
specifications, even when the sample is truncated using instrumental variables to control for
virtually all possibility of endogeneity bias.
 These results have the potential to add to our understanding of regional development
within the U.S., as well as providing perhaps a cautionary note regarding over-emphasizing
natural resource development at the expense of other sectors that make more permanent and
positive contributions to state welfare.7
The paper proceeds as follows.  The following section presents data and methodology. 
Section III presents the results of the empirical tests, Section IV discusses possible connections
between resource abundance and other factors thought to contribute to growth prospects, and
Section V concludes.
 
II.  Data and Methodology
The essential idea of conditional convergence is that given diminishing returns, 
economies tend to converge to equal levels of development (an especially attractive assumption
for economies as closely integrated as the U.S. States), so that growth rates are negatively related
to initial levels of development.  The rate of convergence can also be influenced by other factors,
however, which is where the term “conditional” convergence enters.  A typical specification
would be:
(1)
where  is the logarithm of Gross State Product (GSP) per capita in state i at time t, L is an
averaging operator taking the change in log GSP divided by the number of years T,  is a
measure of natural resource abundance, and is a vector of control variables.  Convergence is
implied by  ; the resource curse is implied by  .8
An extension to equation (1) is the pooled cross-section specification:
(2)
where the variables are now measured at intervals, in the present case of five years, allowing the
inclusion of state fixed effects  to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states that may
contribute to growth, such as political differences, local amenities, size and so on;  and period
fixed effects  to control for unobserved national factors that may change over time, such as
macroeconomic shocks.  We use five year intervals both for data availability considerations and
to mitigate potential problems with serial correlation and endogeneity.
Further, because residuals in pooled estimates with fixed effects and lagged dependent
variables are known to be correlated with the fixed effects, we use the instrumental variable
method of Arellano and Bond (1991) [AB] in a separate estimate.  AB’s technique is to
difference the variables in order to remove state fixed effects, then use all lagged levels of all
regressors to  as instrumental variables.  Because we are already using non-overlapping periods
in measuring the dependent variable and the regressors, the AB technique should obviate any
remaining endogeneity bias.
The present sample includes data from 1977 through 2002 or the fifty states of the U.S.
The dependent variable, as noted above, is the growth rate of GSP per capita.  Other measures of
economic welfare could have been chosen, but GSP corresponds to the GDP measures used in
cross-national studies.  Initial conditions include education levels, as represented by the percent
of the state population with at least a bachelor’s degree, the logarithm of initial income, labor9
force and investment growth, and state taxation rates.  To mitigate problems of common factors
affecting growth and initial conditions in the pooled specifications, at time T = J the growth rate
is measured over the period [J, J + 5]; initial conditions are measured over [J - 5, J].  In this way,
present conditions affect future growth.
[Table 1]
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  Resource
abundance is calculated as the share of total employment accounted for by agriculture and
mining.  Employment is used to give the most extensive possible measure of the contribution of
resources to economic development.  It is notable that the resource share of employment has
fallen by about one-third over the sample.  The next three variables account for inputs to the
production function: human capital, physical capital, and labor.  The growth in physical capital is
measured as new capital spending in the state manufacturing sector, clearly an approximation to
total capital spending, but no comprehensive measures are available on an annual basis.
Finally, we include state and local spending as a percent of personal income to control for
state fiscal burden.  There is no unanimity on the relationship between state taxation and growth: 
one view has taxation as depressing growth by transferring resources form the private to the
public sector; the other view has taxation as increasing growth through the provision of public
goods, such as education.  We cannot resolve this controversy here, but we acknowledge that
taxation may be an influence on growth, and we do report on our findings.
III.  Empirical Results
 Table 2 presents the results of the various regressions of state economic growth on initial5
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conditions including the resource employment share.  All regressions in Table 2 include state and
time fixed effects, which coefficients are not reported to save space.  The first column, Model A,
presents the results of equation (2) with initial income as the only regressor.  Model A is a pooled 
variation on the convergence model of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992).  The coefficient on initial
income,  , can be converted to the estimated  half-life to convergence (in years)  .   
[Table 2 about here]
Convergence in Model A is quite rapid, with a half-life of only 4.6 years, but the
significance of the state fixed effects, as indicated by the F-value of 10.73, implies that
convergence is not absolute; that is, convergence is to different income levels  .  The
rate of convergence here is faster than that estimated in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), a finding
similar to that of Evans and Karros (1996), who also use time series-based methods, and also find
that convergence is relative rather than absolute.
Model B introduces the share of employment in the resource sector as a regressor.  A one
percent increase in a state’s resource share of employment results in about a one-half percent
lower growth rate, after controlling for initial conditions.  At equilibrium, the long term effect of
an additional one percent employment share results in an reduction in per capita GSP of $1,034
in 2002 dollars.
5  The estimated rate of convergence slows to a half life of 5.1 years, and state
fixed effects are still significant, indicating other sources of long-term income differentials across
states. 11
Model C introduces inputs to the production function as regressors.  Of the three, only
education produces measurable results, with each additional percent of the state population with
a college degree contributing an additional 0.2 percent increase in state growth, or about $1,013
in equilibrium per capita GSP.  Capital spending in manufacturing and labor force growth have
no impact.  The use of lagged values for the initial conditions likely reduces the power of these
variables to explain the variation in contemporaneous income, but considerations of endogeneity
problems preclude the use of contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables.  Coefficients
on initial income and resource employment are little changed by the addition of the input
variables.
Model D adds taxation as a percent of state personal income to measure the effect of the
fiscal burden on state economic growth.  Prior evidence on this score is mixed.  Tomljanovich
(2004) finds negative short-run effects of higher tax rates on economic growth, but no evidence
of any effect on long-run growth.  Becsi (1996), on the other hand, finds negative short-run
effects and a tendency for differentials in tax rates to affect convergence in long-term income
levels.  The results of Model D indicate that states with higher tax burdens grow faster, ceteris
paribus.  Coefficients of the other regressors excepting labor force growth are measured with
greater precision after adding the tax variable, especially the investment variable, which is now
significant at the 10 percent level.
We hesitate to make strong claims for the tax result, as our measure of the taxation is
crude (total state revenues), and the ideal measure would be closer to marginal rather than
average tax rates.  Also, it may well be that faster growing states have even faster growing
revenues, especially if tax rates are progressive and inequality is increasing.  Still, we find no6A regression of state growth rates on just initial income, percent college education, and
taxation yields nearly identical results for the taxation coefficient. 
7The instrumental variable regression can be accomplished in either one or two steps; we
use the two-step method here.  See Arellano and Bond (1991) for details and methodology.
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evidence over the sample that tax rates are negative for growth, as many have argued.
6
Model E addresses the possibility that, despite the use of lagged initial values as
explanatory variables, there may yet remain omitted unobservables that affect the dependent
variable and the initial conditions and thus cause the regressors to be correlated with the error
terms.  We use a technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), whereby all variables are
differenced and the first differenced initial conditions are regressed against lagged levels, the
latter serving as instruments that are correlated with the initial conditions, but presumably not
with the growth rates.  The differencing wipes out the fixed effects.  The fitted values of the
initial conditions then serve as regressors.
7
The results of the AB regression in Model E are mostly consistent with the OLS
regression in Model D.  Precision is less as sample size is reduced and standard errors are
increased with the use of instruments, but the “resource curse” is still effective and education
remains an important influence on state growth rates.  The coefficient of the tax variable is
larger, but is no longer measured with significance, nor is investment significant in this
formulation.  The results of the AB regression is therefore evidence against the possibility that
the negative relationship between resource employment and subsequent state economic growth is
due to a common contemporaneous, but unobserved factor.
As an additional robustness check, equation (2) is estimated with manufacturing
productivity as the dependent variable in Model F.  If the resource “curse” is not simply an13
adding up problem, there should be evidence of spillover effects into other industries.  Whether
this happens because more productive factors are absorbed by the resource sector or because of
external inefficiencies like poor governance in the public sector or less emphasis on human
capital is beyond the scope of this paper, but its existence can at least be documented.
Model F differs from its predecessors by having initial productivity per worker rather than
initial GSP per capita as control, but otherwise is the same specification.   The positive sign on
initial productivity may be a reflection of the tremendous restructuring experienced in the
manufacturing sector over the past 25 years.  States with more productive manufacturing sectors
may have been better able to confront foreign competition and expand output, while states with
laggard industries fell further behind.  If labor adjustment to output changes was slow,
productivity would be positively correlated with output.
For our purposes, the important result in Model F is the negative and significant
coefficient on resource intensity.  There is thus some evidence that the growth effects of resource
abundance spill over into other sectors, although the exact mechanism is unknown.  The other
coefficients in Model F are consistent with the prior models, if smaller and only significant in the
case of investment, not surprising given the focus on a single sector in this model.
In the following section, we offer some speculations as to the source of the resource curse
by examining the correlations of resource intensity with other factors thought to be important for
development.  
IV.  Discussion and Speculations
Regression analysis is able to inform us that there is a negative relationship between14
resource abundance and growth, but not why such a relationship exists.  In the absence of a
formal model of state economic development, this section offers some additional, primarily
graphical evidence on the linkages between resources and factors presumed to underlie economic
growth.  The treatment here is similar to the discussion of Gylfason (2001) regarding cross-
national resources and economic development.
A.  Industry Risk/Return Characteristics
Figure 2 is a “star and dog” chart of 11 industrial groups comprising U.S. GDP.  The
upper left, or “star” quadrant includes industries with higher growth/lower risk; the lower right,
or “dog” quadrant includes lower return/higher risk industries.  Portfolio theory maintains that
investors prefer return and avoid risk; primary industries have more risk than the other sectors,
and although Mining has higher returns than Retail or Transportation, it also is more than twice
as volatile.  If investment is irreversible, large investment in resource booms will result in less
than optimal output during slack times; labor market frictions may compound the problem.  
Figure 3 provides some evidence of the effects of resource intensity on volatility of state
GSP growth, and of volatility on growth, by plotting growth against volatility for the period
1977-2003.  Each one percent increase in the standard deviation of GSP growth is associated
with about a 0.2 reduction in growth (t = 5.31).  The average resource intensity (measured as
GSP originating) of the seven labeled states with standard deviations exceeding four percent is
20.0 percent versus a national average of 6.6 percent.    
Taken together, these charts suggest that the primary sector is more volatile and achieves
lower return than other sectors, and that states with a higher concentration of primary industries8Without Alaska and Wyoming, two highly resource intensive but very lightly populated
states, the r-square increases to 0.15
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fare likewise in comparison with other states.
B.  Resource abundance and human capital
Figure 4 is a scatterplot of the percent of the state population with a college degree
against resources as a percentage of GSP (as of 2002).  The coefficient of the resource variable
has t = 1.80, significant at the 5 percent level, and implies that each one percent change in
resource dependence results in a 0.15 percent change in the percentage of the state population
with a college degree.  The equation only explains about 6 percent of the variation in college
degrees, however, so resource abundance plays only a small part in relative education levels.
8 
Still, this finding is consistent with Gylfason (2001), who finds a much stronger cross-country
negative relationship between resource abundance and education levels.  
Gylfason argues that natural resource-based economies are less high-skill labor intensive
and may use lower-quality capital.  If true, the public sector may feel less pressure from industry
and from workers themselves to upgrade human capital skills, resulting in a less productive and a
less flexible labor force.
C.  Resource use and efficiency
Figure 5 displays energy use per capita as a function of resource abundance.  The fit is
very good for such a simple model, with resource intensity explaining 71 percent of the variation
in British Thermal Units (BTUs) per capita.  Simplicity handicaps us, on the other hand, by16
preventing the identification of the source of the relationship.  It may be the case that resource-
rich states like Alaska or Texas are located in more extreme climates or have larger land area
requiring more energy for transportation; it may be the case that resource-related industries are
themselves resource intense in production; or it may be that abundance leads to inefficiency.   
D.  Resource abundance and the public sector
Figure 6 displays the relationship between the size of the public sector and resource
abundance, as of the year 2000.  As noted by Gylfason (2001), resource-rich economies may
imbue governments with a false sense of security and a temptation to spend freely during the
good times.  Given the volatility of the resource sector, government programs put into place
when prices and tax revenues are high may be difficult to reduce or eliminate when prices and
revenues fall.  As shown in the diagram, resource dependence explains 17 percent of the
variation in state government employment (t = 3.72), so there does appear to be a relationship
between the two.  Whether this is because of characteristics particular to primary sectors, which
are among the more heavily regulated industries and therefore have dedicated regulatory bureaus,
or because of the volatility element noted above is beyond the scope of the present study.
E.  The effect on wages in other sectors
Sachs and Warner (2001) note that one channel of transmission for the resource curse is
the so-called “Dutch Disease,” whereby natural resource abundance drives up real wages and
renders exports from other sectors non-competitive.  Figure 7 shows very little evidence of any
relationship between resource abundance and wages in manufacturing, as adjusted for housing9The relationship between resources and unadjusted wages was slightly negative and
insignificant.
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prices (there being no U.S. state-level price indexes).
9  Given the cross-state diversity in
manufacturing, a common currency, and relatively rapid factor mobility in the U.S., it is perhaps
not surprising that local factors such as resource abundance would have little bearing on wage
differentials.   
V.   Conclusion
This paper documents evidence that the “resource curse” –the tendency of resource-rich
countries to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries – extends to the individual states of
the U.S.  Using a variety of specifications, regression of state GSP growth on resource abundance
consistently shows a negative and significant relationship.  An increase of one percent in the
proportion of state employment in the primary sector (agriculture and mining) reduces state GSP
growth by about one-half percent, a surprisingly large number.  This relationship holds even
when confined to a single sector, growth in manufacturing productivity, although the impact is
only about one-third as large.
While this paper documents the “what” of the resource curse in the U.S., it is only a
tentative foray into the “why.”  There is strong evidence that resource-based economies are more
volatile economies, and volatile economies may be less desirable to investors.  Resource based
economies are somewhat less well-educated, although this relationship is certainly not as strong
at the state level as the cross-country would indicate.  Resource-based economies certainly use
more energy, though some of the energy requirements are specific to the needs of primary18
industries.  How much energy use, if any, is due to prodigality from abundance is not known.
There is further evidence that resource-rich states have larger state governments, but no
indication that wages in other sectors are affected.
Further research will focus on the link between resource abundance and volatility, and the
link between volatility and growth.  The volatility of state economic growth will have national
components and state-specific components.  While little can be done at the state level to
ameliorate national components of volatility, identification of state level components can be an








Table 1:     Descriptive Statistics, 50 States, Various Time Periods (in Percentages, except
Initial Income, which is in 2002 $)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
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Table 2:       Pooled Cross-Section Growth Regressions, 50 States, 1977-2002
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*,**,***: Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively25
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